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Berkson v. Lepome, 126 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 46 
(Dec. 16, 2010)1
 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  Separation of Powers 
 
Summary 
 
 Marilyn Berkson and Gertrude Malacky (“Appellants”) appealed a district court order 
dismissing their claims of undue influence, breach of contract, fraud, elder abuse and neglect, 
intentional misstatement of facts, negligence, conspiracy and per se violation of Nevada law and 
misconduct against Robert LePome, Barbara LePome, John Gorman, Howard Bloom, and 
Richard Donaldson (“Respondents”) on issue and claim preclusion grounds stemming from a 
2004 probate and trust action between Appellants and Barbara LePome including undue 
influence charges that were overturned on appeal due to a lack of substantial evidence.  At issue 
was whether NRS § 11.340 is an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers under Article 
3, Section 1(1) of the Nevada Constitution and whether NRS § 11.340 prevented the doctrines of 
issue and claim preclusion from barring the Appellants’ claims.  Appellants also appealed from a 
post-judgment order awarding attorney fees and costs for filing a frivolous claim. 
 
Disposition / Outcome 
 
 As NRS § 11.340, which allowed a plaintiff to file a new action within one year after the 
reversal of a judgment for the plaintiff on appeal, violates the separation of powers doctrine by 
interfering with the judiciary’s authority to “hear and determine justiciable controversies”2
 
 and 
contradicting the established principles of issue and claim preclusion, it is unconstitutional and 
the Appellants cannot rely on it to continue their action.  The Supreme Court affirmed the 
District Court’s dismissal of the action, but reversed the attorney fees and costs award.  The 
Supreme Court felt that the award was an abuse of discretion for the district court to sanction the 
Appellants for filing a frivolous claim when Appellants relied on NRS § 11.340 which had never 
been reviewed and whose plain language clearly permitted them to re-file. 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 In 2001, respondent Howard Bloom petitioned for appointment of special administrators 
for the estate of Rose Miller, Appellants’ aunt, and for appointment of a trustee regarding the 
living trust of Rose Miller.  Appellants opposed the two petitions on the grounds of undue 
                                                          
1  By Cayla Witty 
2  Halverson v. Hardcastle, 123 Nev. 245, 261, 163 P.3d 428, 439 (2007) (quoting Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 
13, 19, 422 P.2d 237, 242 (1967)). 
influence and lack of testamentary capacity. The petitions and the civil complaint were 
condensed in district court.  Eventually, only the undue influence issue remained, as the lack-of-
testamentary-capacity claims were removed from the estate and trust actions and the civil 
complaint was dismissed as duplicative of the estate and trust actions or unrecognized under 
Nevada law. 
 After a jury found in favor of the Appellants on the undue influence issue, in 2006, the 
Supreme Court reversed that judgment, finding that the verdict was unsupported by substantial 
evidence.  Following that reversal, Appellants filed a new complaint in district court with claims 
of undue influence, breach of contract, fraud, elder abuse and neglect, intentional misstatement 
of facts, negligence, conspiracy and per se violation of Nevada law and misconduct against all of 
the respondents.  Respondents moved for dismissal based on claim and issue preclusion bars, 
amongst other things.  The district court granted the dismissal of the complaint in its entirety.  
After Appellants filed this appeal, the district court awarded Respondents’ attorneys fees and 
costs to sanction Appellants for filing a frivolous complaint.  Appellants added this issue to their 
appeal. 
 
Discussion 
 
 Appellants claimed that NRS § 11.340 granted them the right to file a new complaint 
after their favorable jury verdict was reversed.  They argued that this statute precluded the 
application of claim and issue preclusion to their claim, and therefore, the district court could not 
use those doctrines to dismiss their case.  Looking at the statute’s plain meaning with “each 
sentence, phrase, and word . . . meaningful within the context of the purpose of the legislation,”3
 However, Respondents argued that NRS § 11.340 should be struck down as 
unconstitutional as it “hampers the judiciary’s ability to manage litigation through the application 
of the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion, and as a result, runs afoul of separation of powers 
principles.”
 
the Court recognized that if NRS § 11.340 were to have any real effect, it would necessitate that 
claim and issue preclusion could not be applied to bar a new action filed under that statute.  The 
Court concluded that this authorized both a procedure under which a new suit could be filed after 
a suit reversal and a bar to claim or issue preclusion affecting the new file after an appeal 
reversal.   
4
 
 
Separation of Powers 
 
 The Nevada Constitution’s separation of powers provision in Article 3, Section 1(1) 
delineates the foundation for “preventing the accumulation of power in any one branch of 
                                                          
3  Harris Assocs. v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 119 Nev. 638, 642, 81 P.3d 532, 534 (2003) (quoting Coast Hotels v. 
State, Labor Comm’n, 117 Nev. 835, 841, 34 P.3d 546, 550 (2001)). 
4  Berkson v. Lepome, 126 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 46 at 7 (2010). 
government.”5  This principle is further evidenced in the established coequal powers of the three 
branches (legislative, executive, and judicial).  They each administer and perform in their own 
realms, “so as not to become a subordinate branch of government.”6
 As the judiciary is responsible for its own procedures and rule-making necessary to carry 
out the administration of justice, it was held in State v. Dist. Ct. [Marshall] that “the legislature 
may not enact a procedural statute that conflicts with a pre-existing procedural rule, without 
violating the doctrine of separation of powers.”
  Nevada Revised Statute § 
11.340 is an act of the legislature that conflicts with the judiciary’s inherent power to manage 
litigation and reach finality in suits.   
7
 
  The Court held that as such the statute should 
be struck and the court should be left to its own controls.  This not only keeps the balances of 
power in line with constitutional mandates but also allows for the court to administer justice 
effectively, as they are in the best position to determine what is most efficient and workable. 
Claim and Issue Preclusion 
 
 The Court also held that while claim and issue preclusion are legal doctrines and not 
procedural rules, they were still subject to the same constitutional separation of powers analysis 
as procedural rules.  The Court concluded that the public policy reasons behind the preclusion 
doctrines further supports the application of the same separation of powers analysis because both 
claim and issue preclusion are necessary for sound judicial administration and the preservation of 
fairness within the adversarial system.  Because NRS § 11.340 expanded the time and resources 
needed to manage litigation for both the judiciary and the parties, the Court again held that the 
statute be struck on constitutional grounds for violating separation of powers principles.   
 
Attorneys Fees and Costs Award 
 
 As NRS § 11.340 had not been previously addressed and it clearly authorized the 
Appellants’ instant suit, the Court held that the suit could not be considered frivolous.  In 
reviewing the award of attorney fees and costs, the Court concluded that the district court abused 
its discretion, as the statute permitted the Appellants’ repeat filing and the district court 
summarily awarded fees without citation to authority. 
 
Dissenting Opinion 
 
 In concurring with the dismissal of the case, Justice Pickering agreed that Appellants 
were barred from bringing these claims because the case had been resolved in the previous 
appeal and that finality should not be overcome as there was no procedural defect in the previous 
                                                          
5  Sec’y of State v. Nev. State Legislature, 120 Nev. 456, 466, 93 P.3d 746, 753 (2004). 
6  Halverson, 123 Nev. at 261, 163 P.3d at 439. 
7  116 Nev. 953, 959, 11 P.3d 1209, 1212 (2000) (quoting Whitlock v. Salmon, 104 Nev. 24, 26, 752 P.2d 210, 211 
(1988)). 
decision.  However, Justice Pickering dissented from the reasoning in the majority opinion that 
struck down NRS § 11.340. 
 Justice Pickering did not read the plain language of NRS § 11.340 to create an absolute 
right in the plaintiff who was reversed on appeal to re-file.  Instead, Justice Pickering viewed 
NRS § 11.340 as a tolling statute for suits that were reversed on appeal but had not been decided 
on the merits of the case.  
 Justice Pickering argued that NRS § 11.340 dated back to 1861 and has since then begun 
with a reference to limitations periods and should always be read in relation to such concerns, 
not to defenses such as claim and issue preclusion.8  Further, Justice Pickering noted that several 
other jurisdictions have similar tolling provisions, specifically pointing toward 3 Codes of 
California § 355.9  Justice Pickering also pointed out that no other court read its cognate statute 
as the absolute right the majority here did.10  The dissent also criticized the majority’s jump to 
strike a statute when a more limited reading would not lead to the same result.  In Waite v. 
Burgess, the Court declined to read a statute literally that would have also violated the Nevada 
Constitution’s separation of powers clause.11
 
  Because Justice Pickering felt NRS § 11.340 could 
be read in a more restricted manner, Justice Pickering dissented from the majority’s striking of 
that statute as unconstitutional and the majority’s reversal of sanctions. 
Conclusion 
 
 Because the Court struck down NRS § 11.340 as unconstitutional for violating the 
separation of powers principle by creating a procedure at odds with judicial procedures already 
in place and barring the issue and claim preclusion doctrines as a defense to a re-filed suit, 
Appellants Berkson and Malacky could not rely on it to further the instant case.  Since they did 
not provide any reasoning why their case could survive claim and issue preclusion otherwise, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal.  However, the Supreme Court reversed the 
district court’s award of attorney fees and costs because at the time of filing, the Appellants had 
no reason to believe that relying on NRS § 11.340 for a re-filing would turn out to be a frivolous 
claim.   
                                                          
8  The majority also recognized the pre-statehood precedent for NRS § 11.340, but the majority emphasized that we 
had no precedent to rely on.  126 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 46 at 5, fn. 4. 
9  As noted, California does have a nearly identical version of this statute.  However, both the California code and 
the New York code that California relied on in interpreting their own statute had sections added that aided a 
conclusion such as Justice Pickering asserted.  126 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 46 at 14. 
10  See City of Orlando v. Murphy, 94 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1938) (holding that the type of tolling statute mentioned has 
nothing to do with the right to retry a case after all the law in the case is settled).  
11  69 Nev. 230, 232-33, 245 P.2d 994, 996 (1952).  “In the light of our constitutional division of powers of 
government, it is our view that such an invasion of the sphere of the judicial department could not have been 
contemplated by the legislature.”  Id. at 233, 245 P.2d at 996.  
